Abstract-Rates of reliable transmission of hidden information are derived for watermarking problems involving parallel Gaussian sources, which are often used to model host images and audio signals. Constraints are imposed on the average squared-error distortion that can be introduced by the information hider and by the attacker. When distortions are measured with respect to the original host data, the optimal covert and attack channels are two banks of Gaussian test channels. The solution to the watermarking game involves an optimal allocation of distortions by the information hider and by the attacker to the different channels. A fast algorithm is given for computing the optimal solution based on duality theory. For each channel, we derive analytical expressions for two asymptotic regimes: weak and strong host signals. Finally, we extend these results to the class of stationary Gaussian host signals with bounded, continuous spectral density. The analysis also provides an upper bound on watermarking capacity for non-Gaussian host signals.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE widespread dissemination of images, video, audio, and text data on public communication networks raises intellectual-property and security issues that can be addressed using watermarking and data-hiding techniques. Other applications of data hiding include closed captioning and embedding of text and audio in images and video. These areas have seen the development of a plethora of algorithms in the last five years [1] - [3] , but an information-theoretic treatment of the problem is just emerging [4] - [10] . In particular, a theory has recently been developed to establish the fundamental limits of the watermarking (data-hiding) problem depicted in Fig. 1 [4] , [5] .
In this framework, a message is to be embedded in a length-sequence termed host data set, typically data from a host image, video, or audio signal. The embedding is done using side information such as a cryptographic key or side information about the host signal. The resulting watermarked data are subject to attacks that attempt to remove any trace of from . The output of the attack is a sequence . The decoder has access to and and produces an estimate for the message that was transmitted.
The watermarking system should satisfy two basic requirements. The first is usually referred to as transparency, or unobtrusiveness: the data set should be similar to , according to a suitable distortion measure. The second requirement is referred to as robustness: the hidden message should survive the application of any attack (within a certain class) to . For instance, there is typically a limit on the amount of distortion that an attacker is willing to introduce. A watermarking system can be analyzed by defining a statistical model for and , a distortion function, and specifying constraints on the admissible distortion levels for the information hider and the attacker. In particular, we seek the capacity of the system, i.e., the maximum rate of reliable transmission for , over any possible watermarking strategy and any attack that satisfy the specified constraints.
Following a brief review of background in Section II, three related problems are considered in this paper. First, in Section III, capacity expressions are derived for Gaussian channels when all distortions are evaluated with respect to the host data, extending earlier work in which distortions were evaluated with respect to the watermarked signal [5] , [10] . The solution serves as a building block for the second problem, described in Sections IV and V. There, the source is decomposable as a parallel-Gaussian source with channels. In typical applications, would be a -dimensional block of transform data (such as an block of discrete cosine transform coefficients, or a subtree of wavelet coefficients) from a host image, video, or audio signal. In the third problem (Section VI), the source is a stationary Gaussian random process with bounded and continuous spectral density. The paper concludes with a discussion in Section VII.
Notation. We use capital letters to denote random variables, lower case letters to denote their individual values, and a superscript to denote length-vectors. We let denote the differential entropy of a random variable , denote the mutual information between two random variables and , and denote the conditional mutual information between and conditioned on . The mean and variance of 0018-9448/04$20.00 © 2004 IEEE a random variable are generally denoted by and , respectively. The symbol denotes mathematical expectation. All logarithms in this paper are natural logarithms and capacity expressions are given in nats.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Mathematical Model
The problems in Sections III-V admit the following general description. The host-data source emits a sequence of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) -dimensional Gaussian random vectors , where is a correlation matrix. The distortion metric is the squared Euclidean distance , for . Section III considers the scalar case, . Section IV considers the vector case and assumes that the correlation matrix is diagonal with diagonal entries , . Equivalently, may be represented by means of parallel Gaussian channels. The channel inputs are independent sources , , each producing i.i.d. Gaussian random variables
. If the host-signal correlation matrix is not diagonal, the problem can be reduced to the above case by means of the Karhunen-Loève transform, see Section V.
The message of interest is uniformly distributed over the message set , and is to be reliably transmitted to the decoder.
is independent of . The decoder has access to side information. It is assumed that randomized watermarking codes are used, and that the decoder knows the cryptographic key used to select the particular code used. If the decoder has access to no other side information, the problem is referred to as blind watermarking. If, in addition, the decoder has access to the original host signal, the problem is referred to as private watermarking.
Maximum distortion levels are specified for the information hider and the attacker. Let A length-watermarking code subject to distortion is a triple , where [4] , [5] • is the message set of cardinality ;
• is the encoder mapping used to produce the watermarked signal . The mapping is is subject to the average-distortion constraint (2.1)
• (resp., ) is the decoder mapping, producing the decoded message (resp., ) for blind watermarking (resp., private watermarking).
The choice of induces a conditional probability density function (pdf) on the watermarked data. A memoryless attack channel, subject to distortion , is a conditional pdf , , subject to linear distortion constraints. The length-extension of this channel is defined as . Two types of distortion constraints are considered, giving rise to two distinct classes of attack channels Type X. Constraint on
For type-S constraints, we normally require , so that the set of attack channels includes (no attack). The distortions for the information hider and the attacker are equal in this special case. The scenario appears to have only limited practical interest; in fact, the set of attack channels that satisfy (2.3) is empty if is too small, see Remark 4 in Section IV.
The rate of the watermarking code is , and the average probability of error is and for blind and private watermarking, respectively. A rate is said to be achievable for distortions , if there is a sequence of codes subject to distortion , with rate such that as , for any admissible, memoryless attack. The watermarking capacity is the supremum of all achievable rates for distortions .
B. Watermarking Capacity
The papers [4] , [5] have shown that the watermarking capacity defined above is the value of a mutual-information game between the information hider and the attacker. This result is stated in Theorem 2.1. In order to minimize the payoff, the attacker designs an optimal memoryless attack channel that satisfies the distortion constraint (2.4) under type-X constraints, and (2.5) under type-S constraints. In order to maximize the payoff, the information hider optimally designs a covert channel , where is an auxiliary -valued random variable. The covert channel satisfies the distortion constraint (2.6)
We let , , and be the set of channels that satisfy the constraints (2.4), (2.5), and (2.6), respectively. The dependency of and on is via the marginals and , respectively. We omit the subscript or for results that apply to both and .
For any arbitrarily complicated encoding scheme and memoryless attack, Theorem 2.1 upper-bounds the rate of reliable transmission for the information hider, under the assumptions that the attacker knows , and that the decoder knows both and . , where is any function that is invertible for each value of (e.g., ).
C. Gaussian Channels-Type-X Constraints
Assume that , , and (squared-error distortion on the real line). The capacityachieving distributions have been explicitly calculated under the type-X distortion constraints (2.2) [5] , [10] . The capacity is the same for both blind and private watermarking problems: and is given by (2.9) at the bottom of the page, where (2.10) and For small distortions , we have and . Thus, the capacity expression is asymptotically independent of . The optimal attack channel is given by (2.11) where (2.12) and . That is, is the Gaussian test channel from rate-distortion theory [11] . The noise introduced by the channel is independent of the channel input. For blind watermarking, the optimal covert channel is given by (2.13) (2.14) where is given by (2.10) again, (2.15) and is independent of . Note that the optimal distribution is similar to, but not the same as the optimal distribution that achieves capacity in Costa's Gaussian communication problem with side information at the encoder [12] . For private watermarking, the optimal is given by (2.13), (2.14) , where is arbitrary.
III. GAUSSIAN CHANNELS-TYPE-S CONSTRAINTS
For type-S distortion constraints, we show the optimal covert channel is similar to that given in Section II-C, but admits a more elegant closed-form solution: is now the output of a Gaussian test channel with distortion , whose input is . The optimal attack is the Gaussian test channel with distortion level . The solution is stated in Theorems 3.1-3.3 and depicted in Fig. 2 . Note that is not necessarily Gaussian in Theorem 3.1. where is arbitrary, and
where , , and is independent of . The optimal attack channel is given by (3.4) where is independent of (3 .5) and (3.6)
Proof: See the Appendix.
Theorem 3.3:
For blind watermarking of with , capacity is again given by (3.1). The optimal covert channel is given by (3.2), (3.3) where
The optimal attack channel is the same Gaussian test channel as in Theorem 3.2.
Remark 1:
For small distortions , we have and .
Remark 2:
The distributions (3.2)-(3.4) with form a Nash equilibrium of the mutual-information game (2.7) but do not achieve the maxmin value of the game. The optimal attack when is the minimum mean-squared-error (MMSE) estimator of given cascaded with a Gaussian test channel [15] , [16] . The MMSE operation helps the attacker in reducing the distortion with respect to , making it possible for the noise source to have larger variance.
Remark 3:
For the optimal choice , the MMSE estimator of given is itself. Obviously, this choice of makes the MMSE operation least useful for the attacker.
Remark 4:
For , the admissible set of attack channels reduces to one single element, namely, . This attack is reversible, and in that case. For , the admissible set of attack channels is empty.
IV. PARALLEL GAUSSIAN CHANNELS
In this section, we develop watermarking capacity expressions for parallel Gaussian channels with signal powers (as described in Section II-A), and specialize the results to sparse signal models, which have been used in recent signal processing literature.
A. Main Result
First we prove that optimal watermarking and attack strategies decouple the channels and make use of Gaussian distributions in each channel, see Fig. 3 . The power allocations for the information hider and the attacker are denoted by and , respectively. Define weighting factors . Later we shall see that channels with same variance can be combined, yielding nonuniform factors .
Lemma 4.1:
The watermarking capacity for both blind and private parallel-Gaussian watermarking games subject to type-S distortion constraints is equal to Proof: The host-data source may be viewed as a blockwise memoryless scalar source with block length , where data within any block are independent but not identically distributed. The class may be similarly viewed as a set of block-wise memoryless attack channels. Hence, we can apply [5, Proposition 8.2] , which states that for any memoryless covert channel, the optimal block-wise memoryless attack channel is memoryless Conversely, a simple extension of the converse to the coding theorem [5, Proposition 4.2] shows that under memoryless attacks, the optimal covert channel is also memoryless Hence, the solution to the maxmin game (2.7) is attained by memoryless covert and attack channels.
In other words, the optimal pair of information hiding and attack strategies leaves the channels decoupled. Let and be the distortion levels in channel under these optimal strategies. The distortion levels and satisfy the constraints (4.5)-(4.9). For each , the capacity-achieving distributions and are obtained by applying Theorem 3.1 with distortion levels and . These distributions are Gaussian. The resulting capacity for channel is given by (4.3), and the total capacity is given by (4.1).
It remains to optimally allocate the powers and between the channels. Theorem 4.3 reduces this problem to a simpler one and presents its solution. The proof of Theorem 4.3 uses the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2:
The function in (4.3) is convex in and is convex in , over the set defined by the inequality constraints (4.7)-(4.9).
The main ideas used in the proof of Theorem 4.3 are as follows.
1) The payoff function is additive over , and so are the distortion constraints (4.5) and (4.6). The other constraints (4.7)-(4.9) apply to each channel separately. 2) For any fixed , the constrained convex minimization problem in is reformulated as the dual maximization problem , where is the dual function, and the dual variable corresponds to the distortion constraint (4.6).
3) A closed-form solution for each optimal is derived in terms of and . 4) The function is concave in and the constraint set is convex. The maximization problem is converted to a dual minimization problem , where is the dual function and the dual variable corresponds to the distortion constraint (4.5).
5) We have
where is strictly convex in . This maxmin problem is solved using a standard numerical algorithm.
A numerical optimization algorithm based on these properties is described in Appendix F. The dual variables and also represent sensitivity parameters with respect to changes in distortion levels and .
Theorem 4.3:
The optimal power allocations , for the watermarking game in Lemma 4.1 are as follows. If , the optimal attack is ; is arbitrary, and . If , the watermarking game admits a unique solution. For each , the optimal and are zero if ; otherwise, is the unique root of the third-order polynomial (4.11) in the open interval . The optimal is given by (4.12)
The Lagrange multipliers and achieve
An explicit expression for the dual function is obtained by combining (E15), (E16), and (E6). The distortion constraints (4.5) and (4.6) are satisfied with equality.
Remark: Theorem 4.3 gives the solution to the constrained maxmin problem (4.1) for any choice of positive , not just .
B. Properties of Solution
1) (Symmetry).
If for some , then and . This follows directly from (4.11) and (4.12). Hence, the problem can be reduced to one involving distinct channel variances and nonuniform weighting factors , where is the fraction of channels that have variance . As stated in the preceding remark, Theorem 4.3 holds for all such .
2) (Bounds on optimal power allocation). Due to Theorem 4.3, in the nontrivial case , we have (4.13)
C. Asymptotics of Weak Channels
It is shown in the following that if , the bounds (4.9) and (4.13) become tight.
Proposition 4.4:
If for some channel , the optimal power allocations in that channel are (4.14) (4.15) and the contribution of channel to capacity is asymptotically linear in (4.16) The optimal scaling factors in (4.10) satisfy , , and . Proof: Since , the asymptotic balance that yields in (4.11) is . Replacing in (4.11) yields From the equation above, we obtain and . Hence, (4.14) follows. In order to get (4.15), we substitute (4.14) in (4.12), or, alternatively, in the quadratic equation (E4). The leading order term is . The next term in the expansion of is , which yields (4.15). Finally, the contribution of channel to capacity is obtained by employing (4.15) and (4.14) in (4.4)
The asymptotically optimal scaling factors in (4.10) are obtained by substituting the expressions (4.14) and (4. The asymptotically optimal scaling factors in (4.10) are obtained by substituting the expressions (4.17) and (4.18) for and in the expressions for , , and given by Theorem 3.1.
D. Asymptotics of Strong Channels
E. Spike Processes
Recently, Weidman and Vetterli have introduced a simplified model for sparse signal compression [13] . The signal is decomposed into a set of significant components and a set of insignificant components. This model can also be used to derive asymptotic closed-form expressions for watermarking capacity. Assume there exists an integer such that for , and for . From Proposition 4.4, the optimal power allocations tend to zero in the weak channels . From Proposition 4.5, the optimal power allocations and in the strong channels tend to a constant value, which is independent of and must therefore be equal to and , respectively (4.20) where is the fraction of significant samples of the host signal. For any fixed power allocation , one can seek optimal channels subject to distortion constraints . Capacity is the solution to the optimal power allocation problem where Here is the capacity of a single channel with host-signal pdf , where the pdfs and are subject to distortions constraints and , respectively. Let be the Gaussian distribution with the same secondorder statistics as . The capacity under is equal to let be the resulting optimal power allocations. Also let be the optimal power allocations under . We have The second equality is because is optimal under and . The first inequality is because for all , according to Theorem 3.1, part ii). The second inequality is because are optimal under .
It is also interesting that correlation strictly reduces datahiding capacity for Gaussian hosts, as stated in Proposition 5.3 that follows. As mentioned in [5] , it is not clear whether a similar result holds for non-Gaussian hosts in the blind watermarking game. 
VI. STATIONARY GAUSSIAN PROCESSES
Assume now that is a -dimensional stationary Gaussian process in with zero mean and continuous spectral density ,
. It is assumed that is bounded away from zero and infinity:
, and . First we define the watermarking game with maximum distortion levels and , and then derive its solution.
A. Block-Wise Memoryless Approximation
The spectral representation theorem states that any stationary process can be represented as an integral of independent processes indexed by . Given a stationary Gaussian process with bounded, continuous spectral density, one may construct a sequence of block-wise memoryless approximations (indexed by block length ) to the original stationary process. This approximation can be made arbitrarily accurate in a relative-entropy sense, as stated in Lemma 6.1. This allows us to relate the current problem to that studied in Section V.
Let and , respectively, denote the probability distribution and the correlation matrix of the Gaussian vector for . For any , let be the block-diagonal matrix with the first blocks equal to , and the last block equal to , if . Let denote the Gaussian distribution with zero mean and correlation matrix , for any .
Lemma 6.1:
The relative entropy between the distribution and and its block-wise memoryless approximation tends to zero in the following sense:
B. The Stationary-Gaussian Watermarking Game
Proposition 5.1 gives the solution of the watermarking game for block-wise memoryless Gaussian processes (6.2) where is the block length, , are the eigenvalues of the correlation matrix , and and are -vectors that satisfy the constraints (4.5)-(4.9).
We show that is the value of a game in which the payoff is a functional of two power-allocation functions and . 
Lemma 6.2:
As , the sequence converges to the following limit: and . The solution to this game is given by the following proposition, whose proof parallels that of Theorem 4.3, using Fréchet derivatives instead of ordinary derivatives [14] .
Proposition 6.3:
The game (6.3) subject to the constraints (6.4)-(6.8) admits the following solution. If , the optimal attack is , is arbitrary, and . If , the game admits a unique solution. For each , the optimal and are zero if ; otherwise, is the unique root of the third-order polynomial
(c) C versus k. in the open interval . The optimal is given by (6. 10)
The distortion constraints (4.5) and (4.6) are satisfied with equality.
The solution satisfies a symmetry property analogous to Property 1 in Section IV-B.
Property 6.4:
If there exist such that , then for .
C. Example: First-Order Autoregressive Process
We present a numerical solution to the watermarking game for one-dimensional, first-order, autoregressive AR models with zero mean, unit variance and correlation coefficient . The method of proof of Lemma 6.2 suggests the following approach. The range of is discretized into channels, and capacity is computed using the algorithm in Appendix F. Fig. 4 shows capacity as a function of when and . Observe the monotonic reduction in capacity as tends to , due to the fact that the spectral representation of the process is increasingly sparse. Fig. 5 shows the optimal power allocations and the contribution of each channel to capacity for three examples: , , and . The gradual decay of the power allocations as decreases ( increases) is consistent with the weak-channel asymptotics in Section IV-C. The saturation of the power allocations as becomes large relative to and is consistent with the strong-channel asymptotics in Section IV-D. Fig. 6 shows the reduction in capacity as a function of . Fig. 7 shows the speed of convergence of the iterative algorithm, specifically the decay of the absolute excess distortions and defined in (F1) and (F2) as a function of iteration number when . For the case , , convergence is essentially achieved in nine iterations.
Other examples arising in image watermarking are presented in [15] - [17] . An error appeared in the statement of the capacity expression in [16 (see Section III, Remark 3)], resulting in slightly lower capacities. 
VII. DISCUSSION
Optimal power allocation is a classical information-theoretic topic, arising in areas such as channel capacity and rate-distortion theory. For parallel Gaussian sources, the solution to the optimization problems arising in the two above-mentioned areas is fairly simple and is given by the famous waterfilling and reverse-waterfilling formulas, respectively [11] . The solution to the parallel-Gaussian watermarking game is more involved. A significant challenge comes from the game-theoretic formulation of the watermarking problem. The resulting optimization problem is maxmin rather than a simple maximization or minimization problem. The solution is still consistent with the notion, originally formulated by Cox et al. [1] , that "watermarks should be hidden in perceptually significant signal components."
In our initial investigation of this problem (unpublished work, 1999), we sought an expression for capacity of parallel Gaussian channels under the type-X constraints (2.4) for the attacker. This can be done using an approach similar to the one outlined above Theorem 4.3. Numerical implementation of the solution shows that significant power may be allocated by both the information hider and the attacker to weak channels (unlike the results in Section IV-C). This result may seem counterintuitive but is logical in a game-theoretic setting: the allocation of resources by the information hider to weak channels does force the attacker to use a similar strategy under type-X constraints and hence "waste" valuable power that might be better invested otherwise. This suggests that type-X constraints are less natural than type-S constraints, as no such counterintuitive solution exists in the problems studied in this paper.
Other, more recent work by Cohen and Lapidoth [8] , [9] , has explored the use of almost-sure type-X distortion constraints; their capacity is also the solution of a maxmin power-allocation problem, but the resulting power allocations are different. They have also relaxed two of our working assumptions: block-wise memoryless attack channels, and decoder informed about attack channel. These assumptions have turned out to be benign for the single-channel Gaussian problem under type-X constraints [5] , [10] ; whether a similar result holds for the parallel-channel problem remains to be seen.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1 i) For
, the attack is admissible, in which case the value of the payoff function (2.8) is , which clearly achieves the required minimum; so . For , we use the following Lemma A.3 [5] , which provides sufficient conditions for to achieve over the nonrectangular feasible set . 
where all expectations are taken with respect to and . Define as the Gaussian channel
where is independent of . Note that depends on via , , and . By construction, satisfies the distortion constraint (2.5) with equality. Indeed, we have (A7) where equalities and follow from (A4) and (A5), respectively.
Step 2: Let be the linear MMSE estimator of given , where (A8)
Let
. Define the random variable , which is uncorrelated with and has zero mean. Let . We have (A9) where follows from (2.8), is because is a deterministic function of , follows from the definition of conditional mutual information, and holds because forms a Markov chain. Since , conditioned on , is Gaussian, the second term in the right-hand side of (A9) is given by (A10) and only the first term, , depends on . Now we have [26] where Hence, 
The inequality (A19) is due to (A14). Combining (A17), (A18), and (A20), we obtain
where the inequality is satisfied with equality if and only if the distortion constraint (A14) holds with equality, , and thus,
Step 3: We define as where and is specified in (A22). We view as a function of and solve the maximization problem . We have Setting this derivative to zero, we obtain either (which cannot be a solution of the maximization problem) or is a Gaussian random variable that has zero mean and the same variance as . Here equality is because and are independent, inequality follows from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy, and inequality can be found in [26] . Both inequalities are satisfied with equality if is Gaussian and independent of . Since and are independent and forms a Markov chain, and are also independent. Hence the lower bound above becomes where is a Gaussian random variable that has zero mean and the same variance as . The inequality above is satisfied with equality if is Gaussian and independent of . The lowest possible bound is obtained by maximizing subject to the constraint (B1), where
. After some algebra, we obtain and specified in (3.5) and (3.6). The Gaussian test channel satisfies the lower bound with equality.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 3.3 Assume that . Let be the covert channel specified in the statement of the theorem. We show that is the same as for the private watermarking game. So must be the capacity-achieving channel, because capacity cannot be greater than in the case the decoder knows .
We have where is independent of . Hence, the optimal attack channel is the one that minimizes . Also, where is Gaussian with the same second-order statistics as . Now minimize over all Gaussian distributions that satisfy the distortion constraint . Because is jointly Gaussian, there exist two positive constants and and a random variable independent of , such that . Proceeding as in [5] , we derive the inequality (C1)
For the attack channel to be admissible, we need the following condition on and :
where is because , and follows from the independence of , , and . We then obtain (C2)
The right-hand side of (C1) is minimized by maximizing , i.e., choosing that maximizes , and that achieves equality in (C2). Hence, (C3) Substituting in (C2), we obtain the largest admissible value of as
Hence, the payoff for all admissible attacks channels is lowerbounded by (C1) where is given by (C4). The right-hand side of (C1) is then . The attack channel achieves that bound and hence is optimal.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF LEMMA 4.2
In order to prove convexity of with respect to and , we verify the sign of second derivatives of (4.4) with respect to and . First note that (4.4) can be rewritten as
From (D1), we obtain and which is strictly positive for all . From (D2), we obtain and which is strictly positive for all .
APPENDIX E PROOF OF THEOREM 4.3
Let denote the feasible set for , i.e., the set of that satisfy (4.5) and (4.7). Given , let denote the feasible set for , i.e., the set of that satisfy the linear constraints (4.6), (4.8), and (4.9). Because depends on , the feasible set for the pair is nonrectangular. We follow the general approach described by Shimizu and Aiyoshi [25] for solving maxmin problems with nonrectangular feasible sets.
The proof of the first statement of the theorem (case ) is immediate. The proof of the more interesting case is as follows.
Step 1: First we fix the power allocation for the information hider and derive the optimal power allocation for the attacker. These parameters minimize the convex 1 cost function (4.1) subject to the convex constraint . According to the strong duality theorem [24] , the solution to the constrained minimization problem is given by Hence, is strictly concave. Next, using (E5) in (D2), we obtain
Hence, is strictly concave. Thus, is strictly concave in .
Step 2b. Now define the second dual function
The function is convex in (but nonconcave in .) From the strong duality theorem, we have (E17) Then (E9) and (E17) yield (E18)
Step 2c. To evaluate (E15), we maximize the Lagrangian (E16) with respect to .
First we show by contrapositive that the optimal . If , then that maximizes (E16) is given by (E19) where and are specified in (E11) and (E10). Substituting (E14) and (E12) into (E19), we obtain (E. 20) whence Taking the squares of both sides, we obtain
The only admissible solution to this equation is .
But from (E8), this implies , , and thus, which violates the initial assumption above Step 1. So , and the distortion constraint (4.5) is active.
Since the right-hand side of (E20) tends to as , that maximizes (E16) is strictly positive. For this reason, we have not included a Lagrangian term corresponding to the inequality constraints (4.7), as those constraints are necessarily inactive. Now, write (E16) as (E21)
Step 2d. Next we explicitly identify the optimal . At optimality, we have where we have used (E20). Hence, Taking the squares of both sides, we obtain where in the last line is the third-order polynomial defined in (4.11) . By the strict concavity of , the gradient of with respect to has a unique root. Hence, is the unique root of in the interval .
APPENDIX F ALGORITHM FOR COMPUTING CAPACITY
We use the following algorithm to solve the maxmin problem (E18). The method is based on iterative two-dimensional optimization techniques and applies to the nontrivial case . We seek that achieves the maxmin of in (E18 . We solve the nonlinear system using a Newton gradient method. The partial derivatives of the functions and are approximated using finite-order differences. The resulting and (and the corresponding , ) are optimal and satisfy the necessary Kuhn-Tucker conditions. APPENDIX G PROOF OF LEMMA 6.1 Let be the correlation sequence for the process . By our assumptions on the spectral density , is continuous, and . Let , , denote the inverse Fourier transform of , be the Toeplitz matrix with entries , , , and be a circulant Toeplitz approximation to [20] , [21] . The sequences of matrices , , and are asymptotically equivalent [20] , [21] , i.e., they are uniformly bounded (by ) in strong norm, and where denotes the Hilbert-Schmidt (weak) norm of a matrix.
The relative entropy between the Gaussian distributions and is given by [19] , [20] where as 
